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The Tachibana Incident
MARCH I , 1954 was a fateful day for both Haruo Tachibana and
Hutchinson Sugar Company. On that day, Tachibana became agi-
tated over what he thought was the severity of the punishment
imposed on him by the company for failing to turn out to work on
the previous workday. When he lost his temper and tried to pick a
fight with his bosses and failed, and then coaxed his fellow mill work-
ers to walk off from their jobs, the penalty of a one-day suspension
was extended to a full discharge the next day, March 2. That was not
the end of the Tachibana Incident. What was to follow was a near
calamitous strike at the company, the longest ever in the history of
the relationship between the International Longshoremen's & Ware-
housemen's Union (the ILWU) and the sugar companies.
Na'alehu in 1954 was a remote, small and quiet sugar plantation
village in the Ka'u District on the southernmost part of the island of
Hawai'i. It sits on the lower slope of Mauna Loa, some 670 feet in ele-
vation and was home to about 1700 residents. It was a friendly and
pretty town, a model for its harmonious and cooperative spirit on the
Big Island. As union leader William Silva from the neighboring plan-
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tation town of Pahala said, "Here, everybody seems to pitch in at the
same time on a community project. In Pahala, it's more like you wait
for the other fellow to go ahead. This [Naalehu] is a nice town."1
There had not been a labor walkout or any dispute of the least mag-
nitude at Hutchinson since the industry-wide sugar strike of 1946.
How then could this strike have ever happened in this peaceful and
quiet town? And why did it last so long?
PROFILE OF TACHIBANA WHO FELT UNJUSTLY TREATED
Haruo Tachibana was a local boy of Japanese ancestry from a family
of six children. Of slender and medium build, he was regarded in the
community as a leader and "generally well thought of as a person."2
To some, however, he was a contentious person who was inclined to
be defiant towards plantation authority and even arrogant.3 He was
known for his occasional, tempestuous run-ins with management and
others. A good friend and a retired electrical supervisor, Tokuichi
Nakano, grew up living next door to the Tachibanas in the Honu'apo
upper camp before all the outlying camps were consolidated into a
single camp in Na'alehu sometime in the late 1940's.4 The two
attended the Naalehu Elementary & Intermediate School where they
completed the 8th grade, then the highest grade taught there.
Tachibana was always fighting in school and the only way Nakano
remembered gaining his respect was by beating him in a fight one
day. Nakano also recalled how Tachibana went after Nakano's brother
with a hammer and ended up with a black eye instead. Yet, Nakano
had only kind words for Tachibana as a person. He was "a good friend
and he had a good heart."
Tachibana went to work for Hutchinson in 1934 right out of
school. During World War II he served with the famed 442nd Regi-
ment Combat Team having joined as a volunteer, along with his older
brother, Harry, also from Na'alehu. He earned two Purple Heart
awards in combat in the European theater as a member of "M" Heavy
Weapons Company, 3d Battalion.5 When he was discharged from the
army, he had attained the rank of staff sergeant, a sign that his lead-
ership attributes were recognized in the military. He returned to
Na'alehu and his job at Hutchinson as a shop machinist. In 1954,
together with his years in the military, he had been employed for 20
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years with the same company. He was 35 years old and married with
two children.
A penalty of a one-day suspension was not by any means a harsh
form of punishment. In reality it was the typical measure of discipline
meted out by most sugar firms for an infraction such as an unautho-
rized absence. It was strange for Tachibana to have felt that he should
have been treated otherwise, unless he thought there were mitigating
circumstances. After all, he had absented himself for a legitimate
union activity and had given the company advance notice of his
absence. That he was denied permission by the company didn't seem
to be a big thing. In an interview with Jack Burby of the Honolulu
Advertiser, dated June 6, 1954, Tachibana explained that he was angry
because he felt that a one-day suspension for his absence was too
steep for a man with 20 years of service. Besides, he explained, on the
day he was absent the mill was closed and it was raining. (The mill
did not grind that day, but the shop in which he was working was
functioning and the mechanics were busy doing repairs.) He recalled
the times he had been awakened from bed by calls from the mill to
fix machinery. Of the two machinists in the shop, he was recognized
as the more skillful, and thus was relied on more heavily for emer-
gency repairs. Had his remarks stopped there, it would have been an
explainable defense of his behavior. But his darker side was revealed
when Burby quoted him saying, "I told them if this is the way you
folks are going to treat me after all that time, let's go out on the road
and settle this. Some haoles think they can push us around, but they
pick on the wrong guy."
The incident had its origin on Thursday, February 25, 1954 when
Tachibana asked for two days off from work to attend an island-wide
ILWU caucus of union leaders on Friday and Saturday, February 26
and 27. The ILWU represented sugar workers at 26 companies in
Hawai'i. The only unorganized plantations were Waimea Sugar and
family-owned Gay & Robinson, both on Kaua'i and both small. Tachi-
bana wanted to attend the meeting as one of the representatives of
the Hutchinson unit to listen to a briefing on the progress of the
industry-wide sugar negotiations then ongoing in Honolulu. At the
same time, Tachibana asked that Robert Kamakura, the only other
machinist, be excused for the Saturday meeting. The chief engineer
said he couldn't allow both of them to be off on the same day, sug-
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gesting one go one day and the other the next day. Tachibana told his
boss that he could excuse Kamakura on the 27th but he, Tachibana,
would not show up.6 The chief engineer warned him that an unau-
thorized absence was grounds for disciplinary action. Tachibana took
off from work and went to the meeting on both days anyway.
FROM A MINOR SUSPENSION TO OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL
When he reported to work on Monday, March 1, Tachibana was
greeted by his immediate supervisor, Benigno Salvador, who told him
he was suspended for the day and handed him the written suspension
notice. Tachibana was beside himself as he raced to talk to the mill
engineer, Bob Wilkinson, a young, mainland, college-trained engi-
neer who had been at the company for only a short time, to complain
about the suspension. When told that the suspension was not going
to be withdrawn, he swore at Wilkinson and is alleged to have laid his
hands on Wilkinson (while the original statements by the company
included this charge, in subsequent statements the company did not
repeat this allegation) and in anger, he asked Wilkinson to step out-
side to settle the matter. Wilkinson, a much larger person and a boxer
in college, declined. Tachibana then rushed into the office of the
mill superintendent to confront John Jarman about the suspension.
Jarman, a small and wiry person of Scottish origin, was an experi-
enced sugar factory head of the old school. After an exchange, Tachi-
bana flung the suspension notice on Jarman's desk, swore at him and
challenged Jarman to go outside and fight. When Jarman refused,
Tachibana stomped out of the office and went to talk to his co-work-
ers. Shortly afterwards, they all walked off the job. The mill was shut
down for the remainder of the day when the mill employees for the
other two shifts failed to show up for work.
Tachibana was fired for his actions the next day, March 2. The mill
workers returned to work that same day and all company operations
returned to normal. On that afternoon, the ILWU Hawaii Island
division director, George Martin, drove in from Hilo to meet with the
manager of Hutchinson Sugar Company, James S. Beatty. Martin, 29,
was a local boy raised in Hilo, an intelligent and a smooth-talking
union leader. In the short time he had been the island director he
developed a haughty bearing. Those who had dealt with him stated
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that he was arrogant about the power he and his union wielded over
management, and that he had no compunction in showing it. So
Beatty's remarks about the conversation he had with Martin had to
be given some credence. "Beatty said that Martin told him that unless
Tachibana was taken back, the workers might not ratify the industry-
wide contract now being negotiated and he intimated that there
might be a strike."7 The report continued, "Martin denies a strike
threat. He says his remarks were in more general terms about recog-
nizing workers' rights or there would be a strike."
PROFILE OF THE MANAGER WHO STOOD HIS GROUND
James S. Beatty, 57, was an experienced sugar manager. Born in
Rochester, Minnesota of Irish and German descent, he completed
his high school education in Vancouver, Washington. He worked as
an ice delivery man, and in Portland, Oregon as a lineman. Seeking
adventure, he came to Hawai'i at age 19, along with a friend. Instead
of a short stay as intended, he remained in Hawai'i for the rest of his
life. He became a lineman with the electric company in Honolulu,
went to Laupahoehoe on the island of Hawai'i for a short time, and
joined the army during World War I, where he was assigned to line-
man duty. After finishing his service in 1919, he returned to Laupa-
hoehoe Sugar Company. He was restored to his job as a field luna or
overseer and later moved to Hutchinson where he worked himself up
over the years to become manager, first at Paauhau Sugar Company
for a year, then back to Hutchinson, both subsidiary companies of C.
Brewer. When he was confronted with the Tachibana case, he had
been in the sugar business for 35 years and had been manager at
Hutchinson for nearly 17 years.
Beatty was a tall, trim, and big man, who always wore a white shirt
and a tie tucked into it. The cuffs of his khaki pants were rolled into
the high leather boots he wore daily. On top of his mane of gray hair
he wore a straw hat. With dark glasses, which he often did not remove
inside his office, he had a stern appearance. He spoke with a firm,
but modulated, voice, never raising it even when his ire was raised.
He looked like a manager. Kazuo Ikeda, who was then the principal
at Naalehu School, described him 50 years later as "a regular sugar
plantation manager" and "human," but he added, with his workers
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he was "quite a boss."8 In short he was fair and tough, a no-nonsense
manager. Most people in the community thought he was friendly and
a good manager. A former resident, a woman now living in Honolulu
who spent her childhood days in Na'alehu, remembered Beatty
thusly, "he was a good and nice man." Her father was a union mem-
ber.9 A life-long resident of Na'alehu said Beatty knew the family
members of the workers, calling them by their names even when she,
for example, as a young woman was recognized and greeted by him
in Honolulu.10 A former Hawaiian Agricultural Company supervisor
remembered him as "a good and fair manager, although a stern dis-
ciplinarian."11 These comments reinforced reporter Jack Burby's
observation of Beatty:
He is an austere man, aloof, but not the haughty whip-cracker that has
been painted in the ILWU's stories of 'Beattyism'. He demands a job
be done right. He believes that only one man can run a plantation at
a time. He is a plantation manager up from the old school, but he is
no martinet.12
Beatty turned down Martin's request to reinstate Tachibana.
T H E LULL BEFORE THE STORM
For the next seven weeks, like the proverbial lull before the storm,
everything seemed normal in Na'alehu. Work progressed as if noth-
ing had happened. There was some grumbling when Tachibana was
fired, but not too much.13 Yet, if there was no tension in this peace-
ful town, there were misgivings about the probability of some form of
concerted action by the workers, since there was no process in place
for the resolution of the Tachibana discharge. He remained fired, did
not file a grievance, and started collecting his unemployment com-
pensation payments. And he left his tool box and tools at the work-
shop. No meetings were held between the company and the union.
In Honolulu, negotiators were wrestling over a new industry-wide
labor contract when Jack Hall, the regional director of the ILWU,
after being advised of the discharge, passed the word along to Dwight
Steele, lead industry spokesman, that there was some trouble brewing
at Hutchinson involving, "this union leader who was recognized as a
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hothead, but he has 17 years and the union would try to do some-
thing about him."14 Agreement on the sugar contract was reached on
March 21. The contract was ratified by all of the sugar units except
at Hutchinson, where according to a union official then, a vote was
taken at a union meeting and ratification lost out.15
A union business agent, Elias Domingo, out of the Hilo office was
assigned to Na'alehu to interview workers for the purpose of gather-
ing information on past unresolved grievances, ostensibly to prove
the union's allegation that union-management relations had been
strained in the past and that the Tachibana incident brought man-
agement's bad attitude to the forefront.16
On April 20, seven weeks from the day of the discharge, Beatty,
sensing renewed activity by the union, sent a letter to his employees:
We have heard that some of your union leaders have said there will be
a strike of all employees if Tachibana is not taken back. Threats of a
strike certainly won't help this situation and a strike won't get Tachi-
bana back. We feel sure that all of you will think this over carefully
before taking any action that may hurt you and the company.
The letter had no effect. Two days later, on April 22, the strike
began.
WHY WAS START OF STRIKE DELAYED?
When the strike started the town was not surprised. Most had already
gotten word that it would take place. But why was there such a long
delay of seven weeks before the strike was called? The answer is open
to conjecture. No one would give a rational explanation, at least not
in 2003, almost 50 years later when the author revisited Na'alehu. A
few reasons come to mind.
As previously mentioned, the ILWU leadership, whose authoriza-
tion for a strike was required, was preoccupied in industry-wide con-
tract negotiations in Honolulu and could not attend to this local
issue.
Tachibana was not "a highly popular rallying point for a strike."
While he had been a loyal union leader, he was not an elected union
official. No immediate groundswell developed over his discharge.
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Too many members considered him "cocky"or "hot tempered" and
something of "a troublemaker."17
The field workers, comprised largely of Filipinos, were not inter-
ested in the politics of the situation. Long after the strike, in an inter-
view conducted in 2003, an active Filipino union leader said, "it was
a stupid thing to go on strike for one man," a man who was not well
liked. Why then did they go on strike, he was asked? "The majority
voted for it. After all, the union's motto was 'An injury to one is an
injury to all.'18
The Hutchinson unit did not and never had strong leadership.
Whether this was due to its remote location, or due to the dominant
leadership of its manager, who had served as manager there for more
than 16 years and made the unit leadership looked impotent, the per-
ception held by the island and local ILWU leadership was that it was
weak. Because potentially capable leaders (and that included Tachi-
bana) were not eager to assume the unit chairmanship, the job was
passed on to whoever wanted it. The then-current leader was George
Beck, Jr., a small and quiet person, not given to union militancy. He
was a truck driver in the harvesting department; the more aggressive
union members were found in the shops.
While the final decision to wage a strike rested with the interna-
tional offices in Honolulu and San Francisco, speculation was that
Martin, the Hawaii Island division director, played a key role in mak-
ing a strong plea to get Tachibana reinstated. Martin was known for
his style of intimidating management with strike threats, as he surely
did with Beatty on the day Tachibana was fired. Despite Martin's
denial, the words expressed by him at the meeting with the manager
at Hutchinson, as reported by Beatty, were characteristic of Martin's
nature in harassing employers. No one in sugar management under-
estimated the power and sway he held over them. Martin may have
felt that to permit a company to fire a militant union leader with
impunity would undercut the power he had so relentlessly built up
for himself.
Hall's approval had to be obtained before a strike could be called
and he needed the time to make that decision. It is not clear who in
the San Francisco office had authorized this action, but if it was not
Harry Bridges, the head of the ILWU, he was informed before it hap-
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pened. Both were influenced by Martin's strong plea to engage in a
strike to undo the discharge of a rabid union leader. By pushing for
the strike, Martin's aggressive and very successful tactics on the Big
Island would continue to weigh heavily on management.
COMMENCEMENT OF THE STRIKE, APRIL 22
It was the garage employees who led the work stoppage on April
22nd. The 19 workers from the automotive garage department on
that morning demanded at a meeting with H. Alfred Hansen, the
company industrial relations superintendent, that the company drop
its employee testing program, which had been ongoing for over a
year. The employees received the expected "no" as the answer, asked
for a caucus, and failed to return to work at the garage. The mill
employees followed with a walkout. Later all of the shifts of both the
garage and mill workers failed to turn out. All told, 56 employees
went on strike on that day. The company shut down the harvesting
operations immediately. On the following day no work was offered to
the cultivation and other employees. With the strike in full swing
there were in all 277 workers who were out.19
On the next day the union, led by Martin, held two meetings with
company officials at Na'alehu. At each meeting the company told the
union that it was willing to skip the lower steps of the grievance pro-
cedure and have the Tachibana grievance submitted directly to arbi-
tration, provided the employees returned to work. Each time, the
union spurned the offer, replying that Tachibana was not the only
issue, but the testing program was, along with other matters.20
One day later, Saturday, April 24, Jack Hall, flew in from Honolulu
to meet with Beatty. He asked Beatty whether all of the matters,
including the Tachibana discharge, the testing program, and other
matters that the union had brought up, could be mediated instead.
Hall said an arbitrator could only deal with Tachibana's firing, but a
mediator could dig into Hutchinson's labor-management history and
find the root of the trouble. Mediation had the merit of having an
outside third-party intervene, using his persuasive powers to resolve
the differences between the two sides in dispute, but not possessing
the authority to make a binding ruling. One side in the process could
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walk away from a proposed settlement offered by the mediator. The
union was fearful of a binding arbitration ruling that would not rein-
state Tachibana. Most observers felt that the facts of the case would
more likely result in an award upholding management. On the other
hand, the union felt that with a skillful mediator, the company could
be moved to compromise on the issue with only a suspension, not a
discharge.
Beatty said no, the grievance was to go through the procedure as
provided by the labor contract. The meeting broke off and the status
of the new labor contract at Hutchinson remained in doubt. Hall was
quoted in the newspaper that the contract, "was neither ratified nor
unratified."21 The company said the old agreement remained in
effect until the contract expired on August 31, 1954, acknowledging
that while the August 1953 contract opening had been exercised and
resulted in a settlement for all the companies in the industry, that set-
tlement had not been ratified by Hutchinson nor the local union.
Recognizing that the strike could be protracted, the company
decided on Monday, April 26, to salvage the cane on the ground that
had been cut before the strike began. Supervisors drove four haul
cane trucks into the field and, with the field crane, also operated by
a supervisor, loaded the cut cane stalks into the truck beds. They
brought the 300 tons of cane into the mill yard where the mill, also
run by supervisors, processed it. The union did not interfere with the
recovery operation. After this salvage operation was completed, the
company said it planned no further attempt to operate the mill.
Three days later, in a Honolulu Advertisements item dated April 29,
1954, Beatty said, "the trouble was stirred up by ILWU leaders who
don't live in Naalehu." Beatty said that most of his workers were
against the strike. It was true that outside union leaders had come to
Na'alehu to abet the strike. Yoshito Takamine, an experienced busi-
ness agent from Honoka'a, (later to become an elected representa-
tive in the legislature) spent almost full time in Na'alehu helping to
organize the strike activities. Yasuki Arakaki, a radical union leader
from Olaa Sugar Company, was also a frequent visitor who worked to
shore up the spirit of the strikers.
Jack Hall said that Beatty and his supervisors had been trying to
undercut the union since the first contract was signed in 1946. Beatty
replied,
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The record of Hutchinson grievances speaks for itself. There are per-
sonality clashes, certainly between militant union leaders and manage-
ment representatives everywhere. It's quite normal. But if Hutchinson
had a conflict in this sphere, there certainly would have been a flood
of work stoppages and grievances. No grievance in Hutchinson's his-
tory has ever had to go to arbitration. It should be remembered that
there has not been a single picket, there has been no violence, no
threats, no heated tempers, no indication whatsoever that feelings are
running high. The company's operations of the mill went off without
the appearance of a single picket and without a protest by the union.
There is no better indication that this dispute is unpopular with the
vast majority of the rank and file, and that it is rather an artificial dis-
pute engineered by union leadership outside Naalehu.22
HARRY BRIDGES TRIES TO INTERVENE AT THE T O P
Two more weeks went by without any movement by either side. In
fact, during this time, the ILWU had begun a behind-the-scenes
attempt to settle the dispute. According to Sanford Zalburg, author of
a biography of Jack Hall, A Spark is Struck, Harry Bridges, head of the
ILWU in San Francisco, secretly contacted James Blaisdell, the former
president of the Hawaii Employers Council, who after leaving the
Council in 1947 had started his own law firm in Honolulu, to propose
that the matters in dispute be mediated. Blaisdell, in turn got in touch
with Alan Davis, CEO of C. Brewer & Company, the parent company
of Hutchinson, to convey Bridges' concern that the strike could inten-
sify unless something could be worked out, perhaps through media-
tion. Davis did not budge, supporting his manager, Beatty. His answer
was that the company's stand was based on the right of management
to manage the company. If the union felt that the company had vio-
lated its labor agreement, the contract provided redress: arbitration.
To Davis, adherence to the labor contract was a matter of principle.
By the time Davis issued a statement to the stockholders of Hutch-
inson Sugar Company on May 12, the strike had gone on for three
weeks. In it he said that the walkout was a test of "vital principle"
which could not be compromised. He reasserted his belief that it was
"management's right under the contract to discharge an employee
for cause without the approval of the union leaders." He accused the
ILWU officials of calling the strike at Na'alehu to force rehiring of
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Tachibana because he was a strong union man. He continued his
statement,
Numerous indirect approaches were made to your company by top
union officials to reinstate the discharged employee. These officials at
first threatened to withhold ratification for Hutchinson of the industry
agreement when concluded and later added the threat of a strike. In
an attempt to divert attention from the real issue, union leaders hastily
sought to attribute the walkout to grievances which they alleged to
exist between the company and its employees. Since then, their tactics
have taken a new turn and they are presently engaged in a personal
attack directed against J.S. Beatty, manager of your company.
These leaders have been told that your company will not bow to
their threats of force and surrender to them the right to manage. I am
confident that you will agree with me that this vital principle cannot be
compromised. The situation is developing into a very serious one. A
prolonged strike can produce nothing but dire results. The very exis-
tence of a peaceful little community of some 1700 people depends
upon a return to work and a fair and impartial settlement of this dis-
pute in accordance with this contract. For these union leaders to reck-
lessly destroy an enterprise that has taken the better part of a century
to build and for them to deliberately create suffering and hardship for
so many people seems incredible. Should the action of the leaders
preclude the ultimate resumption of operations at Hutchinson, the
responsibility will rest squarely upon the leadership of the ILWU.23
Davis was referring to the campaign to impugn the character of
Beatty. It was Robert McElrath who coined the term "Beattyism" in his
attack against the manager. McElrath was the public relations spokes-
man for the ILWU. He said,
Beattyism is a whistle or a roar instead of courteously calling a person.
Beattyism is an 'I'm the boss' attitude,' and 'You'll watch your step if
you want to keep your job around here.' Beattyism is a militaristic
approach to labor relations.24
McElrath also called Beatty the "King of Naalehu." In fact, every man-
ager of a sugar plantation was like a mayor, if not a king. He arranged
for rubbish pickup in the community; he usually ran a plantation
store where workers shopped on credit; he paved the roads on which
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workers traveled; he fixed the houses that the workers rented from
the plantation; he provided a water and sewage system for the work-
ers in the community; he provided the use of the only assembly
rooms and halls in the community without charge; he provided the
workers and their families the use of the only athletic fields for recre-
ation; he provided medical services for the worker and his family. But
plantation workers were not subjects; they were all members of an
active union. So the title "king" did not reflect adversely on Beatty;
his response to the charges was that they were "not worth answering."
The workers started preparing for the eventuality of a long strike.
But there was only a handful of people in the community who pre-
dicted that the strike would endure that long—129 days, the longest
strike ever directed at a sugar company by the ILWU. (It even sur-
passed the length of an industry strike that would come later. In 1958
the union would strike all of the sugar companies for 126 days.) With-
out monthly paychecks and store credit, the workers formed a com-
mittee to establish a soup kitchen. Canvas tops, wooden supports for
tent posts, tables and benches normally used for the annual Na'alehu
4th of July carnival, were all used to set up an outdoor kitchen and
dining tables where workers and families could get their meals. Hunt-
ing and fishing parties were organized to obtain wild game and fish
to be turned into meals. Vegetable gardens were planted. Union com-
mittees were formed to go "bumming," that is, asking for donations
of produce from sympathetic owners of shops and markets. Women
volunteers helped in the mobile kitchen to prepare each meal. Mon-
etary donations were sought from the treasuries of supporting ILWU
units and from local merchants and business firms on the island that
had been patronized regularly by the workers.
House rental payments were deferred and the company made no
attempt to collect them from the workers during the strike. But most
employees prepaid their medical plan premiums to be certain of con-
tinued medical services, alleviating the fear that the company would
suspend services for non-paying workers. (Medical services under the
plan were provided directly by a company-hired physician and staff,
and hospital costs were billed to and paid for by the company. The
sugar companies never discontinued medical or hospital services in
any work stoppage, although on occasion, when strikes were of long
duration, such as in the 1958 strike, they threatened the workers of
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that eventuality because the companies subsidized the major portion
of the cost.)
Union and management rhetoric escalated. The union attack was
pointed at Beatty. Caricatures of the manager drawn by the union
cartoonist in union and affiliated publications depicted him as a
Simon Legree using his whip on his workers. The company
responded with its own bulletins to refute the claims made by McEl-
rath. Beatty told his employees they were being shuffled around like
checkers on a checkerboard. It was a foolish strike that could only
hurt them, he said. And for what?
Ask yourself this question: will I get more wages, or benefits or any-
thing else when the strike is over? Is the strike for more wages? No. Is
the strike for more benefits? No. Is the strike for better working con-
ditions? No. Is the strike for any reason that will help me? No.25
A STRIKE ABOUT PRINCIPLE AND POWER
There would be no winners at the end of this strike. At least, not eco-
nomically. The workers in the end gave up over $300,000 in lost
wages.26 The company lost at least that much financially. From the
beginning each party knew that the goal was not increased wages or
benefits, nor was it to resolve alleged gripes and grievances. While it
was about the reinstatement of Tachibana, it was about something
more than that. Simply put, the strike was about the struggle for
power. Could the union place restraints on management's ability to
manage its workforce to the extent it could dismiss with impunity a
militant union leader for misconduct? Would the union lose its power
not only at Hutchinson, but at all the other sugar companies, that it
had successfully accreted and harnessed for itself in the few short
years since 1945 when it organized the sugar industry in Hawai'i? Did
the union have the power to whittle away management rights that
were agreed to in the labor contract through threats of, or actual acts
of, an illegal job action?
In 1953 Waialua Sugar Company had established a wage incentive
program for cane haul drivers operating the newly purchased Tour-
nahaulers, mammoth truck trailers, with which the union did not
agree. The union preferred a group-wide incentive to include not
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only the drivers but the crew members in one inclusive gang incen-
tive. The harvesting crew began a slowdown that ultimately ended up
as a company lockout that ran for over 100 days. Waialua finally capit-
ulated when it became too costly to continue the strike, although
Waialua explained that an unfavorable arbitration ruling at another
company, Oahu Sugar Company, on a similar issue, was the reason it
gave in and agreed to withdraw the incentive plan.
The history of the ILWU and the sugar industry relationship was
replete with such illegal job actions. From the advent of unionization
with the first industry-wide contract in 1945, until 1954 there were 19
recorded instances when the union engaged in illegal work stop-
pages. The length of the strikes ranged from 1 day to 129 days.27 The
union usually won out with rare exceptions to that rule. These job
actions were illegal when engaged in during the term of the contract
because they were banned by a clause agreed to by the company and
the union. Between contracts, the union could legally exert economic
pressure by engaging in a strike in order to gain better contract
terms, but once a contract had been agreed to, such concerted activ-
ity was banned by the no-strike clause.28
THE STRIKE ENTERS THE FOURTH MONTH
There was no open line of communications between the union and
management as the Hutchinson strike entered the fourth month.
Wives were feeling the pinch of the loss of income. Meals continued
to be eaten at the union's soup kitchen in the ball park. The striking
workers showed their dismay at the prospect of a strike with no end
in sight and with no economic gain. The sugar company was count-
ing its loss of cash revenues and found that loss to be threatening its
future survival. Clearly both sides wanted a solution to this dispute.
Both wanted to see an end to the strike. But a compromise did not
appear possible. The union sought nothing less than the rehiring of
Tachibana. Management, on the other hand, would not countenance
his return to the job. Even the company's offer of arbitration as a
means of resolving the dispute was no longer on the table.
Life in the village went on, but it was humdrum. A few workers
would picket the company's main office and garage facilities. But
picketing was not essential since the company had made no attempt
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to resume operations and there were few visitors to inform of the
strike. The union was unhappy over the salaried employees who
showed up daily at the company office. Many of the women who
worked at the office, and who were paid in full throughout the strike,
as was the entire management staff, had spouses or family members
who belonged to the union. A decision was made by the union to
coerce (by management sources) or to invite (by union sources) the
office workers to walk the picket line for a week. These clerks were in
a quandary. They summoned enough courage to ask their depart-
ment head (Archibald Johnson, office superintendent) what they
should do. One remembered that Johnson was not happy about this
turn of events, but said that if she must, then the company would not
stand in her way. She joined the picket line reluctantly for a full week.
She was surprised and pleased that the company continued her pay
during the week she was absent picketing against her company.29
BEGINNING OF THE END
Sometime in early August it was surmised that Bridges and Hall, as
had happened in past strikes that seem to go on interminably, con-
cluded that the union had to cut its losses. The strike was not
winnable.30 Certainly, talk on ending the strike did not emanate from
the local unit, which lacked the leadership to initiate action. Like-
wise, the decision to begin the strike four months before had not
been made by the local unit. Talks between the top leadership of the
union and the C. Brewer corporate office commenced over a return-
to-work settlement. Off-the-record meetings were held in Honolulu
between the principals of the two parties. Beatty and Martin also
joined in the talks. But the meetings broke off without any meeting
of the minds. Then, "Hutchinson announced it had lost so much
money that it would have to withdraw its offer to sign on the same
terms as the industry-wide contract now in effect for the rest of the
industry unless the dispute were settled by August 31. "31
In the fourth week of August, talks were resumed with Tachibana
in attendance. Progress was made in the second round of negotia-
tions and soon a settlement was announced on August 26. The mem-
bership at Na'alehu voted in favor of the settlement the following
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day. About 200 workers took part in the vote and the unofficial tally
as given by the union was about five to one in favor of accepting the
terms. After 129 days, the strike was over. Joy was subdued in Na'a-
lehu at the end of the strike. The patience of the community had
been tried and found wanting as the dispute dragged on so long. A
calm prevailed with little or no excitement generated among the res-
idents. Full resumption of work ensued after a weekend of work by
small crews to start up the long unused boilers in the factory, and to
do the preparatory maintenance of the idle trucks and tractors
parked in the garage or left in the fields.
TACHIBANA DID NOT GET HIS JOB BACK
As part of the settlement the two parties agreed to the terms of the
industry-wide agreement that was arrived at in March 1954. All
employees on the payroll as of April 21, 1954 would be put back to
work, which excluded Tachibana. All grievances raised by the union
were dropped, except in one case where the employee involved would
be permitted to process it in accordance with the contract. The com-
plaint about providing an ambulance to the hospital in case of emer-
gency was settled by a company pledge to work out arrangements for
such transportation when it was ordered by the doctor. Employees
would be permitted a reasonable time to work off their debts to the
store or the company. And the parties signed on to a policy that
upheld the employee testing program with specified guidelines on its
application in filling job vacancies and promoting within the trades.
The union conceded Tachibana's dismissal as final. Some alluded
to an unstated quid pro quo in the final settlement. The speculation
was that Alfred Hansen, the industrial relations superintendent, who,
along with Beatty, bore much of the brunt of the union's attack for
the mishandling of grievances, would be retired after he returned
from a three-month vacation. Dwight Steele, president of the Hawaii
Employers Council, in a memo to member companies, categorically
denied any such agreement had been made, stating that Hansen
would return to his job after he completed his vacation. The company
announced "the hiring of an assistant to Hansen, filling a vacancy
created [about a year ago] by the promotion of Harold Hee to the
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position of industrial relations superintendent at Paauhau Sugar Co."
He was Roy Replogle, who succeeded Hansen after the latter's retire-
ment the following year.
Beatty sent a memo to the employees at Hutchinson in which he
urged the employees to work together and to do all they could to
make Na'alehu a pleasant, happy place to live. "I know all of us are
glad that we are going to work and earn our wages. It is a very happy
thing to be working again.32
Davis issued a statement on behalf of the company,
The long costly strike at Naalehu is now ended. It would have been
avoided if the union had followed the regular, lawful procedures pro-
vided for in our collective bargaining contract. The position taken by
the company in upholding the observance of contractual obligations
and refusing to submit to pressure or to bow to expediency has been
vindicated.33
The union offered no official statement. Hall said in response to
Davis' remarks, however, that "vindication came pretty high for
Hutchinson."34 It was abundantly clear that the union had lost the
strike, but in doing so, it had inflicted severe financial strains on the
company. This was the lesson the union wanted to bring home to any
sugar plantation that dared in the future to discharge a militant union
leader, or to challenge the union during the period a contract was in
effect. But unstated was the price paid by the workers at Hutchinson
Sugar who went without a paycheck for over four months. At a Hono-
lulu meeting of the heads of the industrial relations departments of
the Big Five firms, C. Brewer's Howard Babbitt was congratulated by
the rest of the companies for the way the strike wound up.35
POST-STRIKE NA'ALEHU
The cooperative spirit which marked the Na'alehu town never dimin-
ished. Any rancor arising from the disastrous strike that might have
lingered for a while between individuals could not be detected a few
months later. Na'alehu once again assumed its neat, friendly, small
town status. People on both sides in the community remained friendly
with one another.
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At the plantation level, the relationship between the union and
management was unchanged and remained good. Kuniyoshi Ara-
kaki, then the ILWU unit secretary, noted that the attitude on the
part of management was improved, citing as an example, how under
Replogle, the new industrial relations superintendent, union-man-
agement relations seemed to be better than before the strike. Han-
sen was criticized by many for being too one-sided and not balanced
in resolving employee complaints. Another claimed that he gave the
union a bad time. Hansen had been a field department head before
being assigned the personnel position, a job he probably felt uncom-
fortable at and unsuited for.
Outside of some name-calling and a single incident where an out-
side agitator allegedly punched or tried to punch Beatty during the
strike, things remained calm in the main. There were no nasty con-
frontations or violence committed by either side. Except for engaging
in aerial fertilizing through a service contractor, the company had not
tried to work the fields or the factory during the strike; it did not pro-
voke the strikers with some overt action, such as demanding rental
payments or collection of overdue payment of store debt. The rhet-
oric expressed in bulletins churned out by the union and manage-
ment might have appeared inflammatory, but neither party was so
offended as to take the matter to another level. Each took to the writ-
ten (or in the case of the union, in addition, the over-the-air spoken)
medium to respond. Both the company and the union had suffered
too much from the strike to want to create a situation that could
restart another confrontation. Both sides were eager to get back to
work.
Tachibana was gone, never to return to his hometown. He was
appointed an ILWU official, representing the east side of the Big
Island. Tachibana's tenure with the union was short. By then he was
disillusioned and felt betrayed by the union leadership for not back-
ing him up to the end.36 After a brief stint as a salesman of cemetery
plots in Hilo, he left for Honolulu where he became an independent
sales agent for a line of pots and pans, a job at which he reportedly
was highly successful.
Beatty retired from Hutchinson in 1962 at age 65 and moved to
Honolulu as well. Both he and Tachibana passed away in the lggo's.
There are a couple of anecdotes that circulate today among the
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survivors of the strike in Na'alehu. One involves an incident in
which the outside "agitator," Yasu Arakaki from Ola'a, allegedly
struck Beatty with his fist when they met in the village camp during
the strike. This account was widely talked about during the strike and
aroused some community members in Na'alehu to retaliate against
Arakaki.37 The other involved an alleged post-strike visit by Tachi-
bana to Beatty, while the latter was convalescing at a Hilo hospital, to
apologize for having caused the turmoil at the plantation. Those who
knew Tachibana well said that this could have taken place because
"he was a nice guy inside."38 Both dramatic events, if true, demon-
strated the stress and pathos that the record-long strike had evoked.
There is no more sugar in Na'alehu. Its last cane was milled in 1996
when Ka'u Sugar Company ceased production. Hutchinson had
merged with its neighboring sugar plantation, Hawaiian Agricultural
Company, to form Ka'u Sugar Company in 1973. Today the ILWU
represents the workers in the macadamia orchards located in Pahala.
The monkeypod trees are still found along the mauka or mountain-
side, of the highway through the town, but now there are banyan
trees as well. There is a fence in place of the stone wall that fronts the
Na'alehu School. Large plots of untended and uneven cane growth
are visible from the highway. The homes with the corrugated iron
roofs are still there, but a number of them have new tenants/owners.
A few of he younger families have left for other places with more job
opportunities. Those who remain find work at Oceanview or in Kona.
Most of the company retirees still live in the homes they had pur-
chased from the sugar company. A few new houses have been built
since the strike. The plantation manager's home, with an addition, is
now the site of the Sea Mountain Punaluu Bake Shop and Visitors'
Center. The Naalehu Coffee Shop, a short distance from the highway
on Ka'alaiki Road, is still ensconced in the original building, though
newly renovated. Churches line the main street where department
heads had their homes. And the rutted road that once channeled
flood waters from the upper cane fields to the front of Tommy's Ser-
vice Station, now called B&E Union 76, is paved with asphalt and
there is a flood control drainage ditch. There are fewer residents in
the town, estimated now at about 1200 and even fewer, if the 2000
U.S. Census figure of 919 residents is accepted as the count, down
from about 1700 in 1954.
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In 1953, Na'alehu celebrated Independence Day with a parade/
rodeo/carnival, a three-day festive affair. It was the 13th annual obser-
vance and by far the largest according to police reports. An estimated
crowd of 10,000 people traveling from all parts of the Big Island
attended the event. The rodeo even attracted some cowboys from
O'ahu. Cars lined the highway early in the morning to secure vantage
parking spaces. The event was annually sponsored by the Naalehu
Community Association, and through the help of all of its resident-
members and the support of the sugar company, derived revenues in
1953 of about $8000. Independence Day in 1954 found the com-
munity in the throes of a strike and the association cancelled that
year's observance. On the 4th of July 1955, the event was resumed,
although on a smaller scale. That it was continued at all the year fol-
lowing the strike and the ensuing years, reflects the resiliency of the
residents of this community and their ability to bounce back after an
adversity. The rodeo/carnival lost much of its grandeur with the
merger change in 1973 which reduced the company support, and
the ultimate abandonment of all sugar operations in Ka'u in 1996.
Yet, today, Na'alehu still observes the 4th of July and holds a rodeo
two to three times a year. Na'alehu, the "southernmost community of
the United States," remains the remote and tranquil country village
it was in 1954. To its present residents, it still is the most friendly and
harmonious place to live. Most residents have not heard of the
Tachibana Incident, and those few who do remember, don't dwell on
him or the incident.
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